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Many developing countries have moved into the production of non-traditional 
agricultural products to diversify their exports and increase foreign currency earnings. Accessing 
developed country markets and urban domestic markets requires meeting the food safety 
requirements due to several demand and supply side factors. Food retailers have developed 
protocols relating to pesticide residues, field and packinghouse operations, and traceability. In this 
changing scenario where food safety requirements are getting increasingly stringent, there are 
worries regarding the livelihood of the poor since companies that establish production centers in 
LDCs might exclude them. Poor producers face problems of how to produce safe food, be 
recognized as producing safe food, identify cost-effective technologies for reducing risk, and be 
competitive with larger producers with advantage of economies of scale in compliance with food 
safety requirements. In enabling the smallholders to remain competitive in such a system, new 
institutional arrangements are required. In particular, public-private partnerships can play a key 
role in creating farm to fork linkages that can satisfy the market demands for food safety while 
retaining smallholders in the supply chain. Furthermore, organized producer groups monitoring 
their own food safety requirements through collective action often become attractive to buyers 
who are looking for ways to ensure traceability and reduce transaction costs. This paper compares 
how small producers of different fruit and vegetable products in different countries have coped 
with increased demands for food safety from their main export markets. These commodities are 
Kenyan green beans, Mexican cantaloupes, and Indian grapes.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have moved into the production of 
non-traditional agricultural products to diversify their agricultural exports and increase foreign 
exchange earnings. High altitude regions in a number of African and Latin American countries 
enable the growth of cool season crops year round, providing an opportunity to export these 
products to developed countries. Similarly, tropical regions in many Latin American and Asian 
countries enable the growth of high value fruits (like grapes, bananas, etc.).  
Currently, most non-traditional crops in Africa are produced for export to the European 
markets, while in Latin America most non-traditional crops are exported to North America. 
Products from Asia go either to European or North American markets, depending on 
transportation costs, market competition, and whether the product adheres to the food safety 
requirements of the destination markets. Both national and international firms that source supplies 
from these countries have high standards and provide technical assistance to their suppliers to 
ensure the delivery of products with certain safety attributes to high-end markets. 
Food safety has received heightened attention in developed and developing countries. 
This has followed from an increased demand for safe food by households with rapidly rising 
incomes, technological improvements in measuring contaminants, the expansion in the set of food 
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exporting countries, and increased media and consumer attention on the risks of food borne 
illnesses associated with recent food scares (e.g., salmonella in cantaloupe, pesticide residues in 
green beans and grapes). In response, food retailers and food service firms in developed countries 
(DCs) have created private protocols relating to pesticide residues, field and packinghouse 
operations, and traceability. Likewise, governments in both DC and LDCs have responded with 
voluntary and occasionally mandatory programs for food safety. Among the examples of such 
initiatives are the programs to register pesticides in Morocco (World Bank 2005) and the 
implementation of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HAACP) programs in China to 
reduce sanitary and phytosanitary problems in canned food, aquatic products, meat and meat 
products, frozen vegetables, fruit/vegetable juice, and frozen convenience food containing meat 
or aquatic products (Dong and Jensen 2004).   
While the development of food safety standards has reduced the risks from foods, it has 
often come at the cost of temporary import bans, particularly of LDC food exports to DC markets. 
During May 1999-April 2000, the number of detentions by the US originating from 52 countries 
was 9,875, with India accounting for the most detentions. During December 2001-November 
2002, 997 detentions from India resulted in 2.6 million dollars worth of rejections of Indian 
exports (Mehta and George 2003). Recently, between February 2006 and January 2007, the 
number of detentions was 16,818 (FDA 2007).  India again faced the highest number of 
detentions with a total of 2,085 detentions.  
The increased food safety standards in both developed and developing countries can 
potentially exclude small farmers who face four distinct problems: 1) how to produce safe food; 
2) how to be recognized as producing safe food; 3) how to identify cost-effective technologies for 
reducing risk; and 4) how to be competitive with larger producers (Narrod et al.. 2005). As supply 
chains become more complex, supply chain management (SCM) plays an increasingly important 
role in the delivery of high-value agriculture (HVA) products to distant markets. Given the 
perishable nature of HVA and the demand for quality and safety attributes, relationships, 
networks, skills, and coordination mechanisms are needed to manage the flow of products 
between intermediaries and ensure that the quality specifications are met. A variety of 
institutional arrangements such as collective action (CA) and forms of public-private partnerships 






cooperatives and monitoring their own food safety requirements through CA often become 
attractive to buyers who are looking for ways to ensure traceability.  
This paper compares how small producers of fruits and vegetables (F & V) in different 
countries have responded to increased demand for food safety from the markets they export to. 
The three cases are green beans in Kenya, cantaloupe in Mexico, and grapes in India. These cases 
differ in the ways in which they have adapted to the changes in international food safety standards 
(IFSS) and the types of institutions that have emerged to ensure compliance with IFSS.  
The green bean exports from Africa that go to the European supermarkets are mostly in a 
pre-packed, pre-cut form, which normally requires a large investment to coordinate supply and 
upgrade hygienic conditions at the farm/packing house. It moreover requires a mechanism such as 
third party certification to ensure that specific standards are met. Findings from Okello (2005) 
suggest that CA was helpful for small farmers in overcoming entry barriers created by IFSS.   
A similar success story in horticultural exports from India is that of a marketing partner 
named Mahagrapes to a collection of cooperatives that started exporting grapes to Europe in the 
early 1990s. As reported by Roy and Thorat (2006), in the first five years of exports, the 
cooperatives faced extremely high rates of rejection (at times greater than 80 percent). With the 
aid of the public sector, the cooperatives were able to install cold chains and pre-cooling facilities, 
and facilitate high rates of information dissemination related to IFSS. Consequently, the rejection 
rates came down substantially to less than 10 percent in late 90s and to less than 1 percent after 
2001.   
The third case based on Avendaño et al. (forthcoming) relates to the cantaloupes from 
Mexico exported to the US that were implicated in food safety concerns in 2000, 2001, and 2002. 
This resulted in a ban on imports from all Mexican sources in 2002. Later, the US opened the 
market to selected firms with Mexican and US government approval. When the US firms began 
demanding Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) and Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), to 
minimize microbial contamination in fresh produce, the end result was a two-tier system where 
larger farmers catered to export markets and the smallholders to domestic markets. Importantly, 
given that very little time has elapsed since the food safety shock, there has been an absence of 
both CA and PPPs in this case.    
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the growth in supply of 






countries have responded. Section 3 looks at the development of various domestic and 
international food safety standards (such as HACCP, traceability, supermarket code of practices) 
for these suppliers. Section 4 looks at the role of supply chains in the delivery of fruits and 
vegetables, and the market outcomes that are likely to prevent smallholders from accessing these 
supply chains. It also briefly discusses the role played by different institutions in enabling 
smallholders to access the HVA chains. Section 5 focuses on the three cases involving 
smallholders. Section 6 looks at the specific difficulties smallholders face in these chains. Section 
7 discusses the institutional mechanisms that have facilitated smallholders in overcoming 
constraints relating to the IFSS in these specific cases. Section 8 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. GROWTH OF THE SUPPLY OF FRUITS AND 
VEGETABLES AND THE RESPONSE OF LDCS 
Since 1971, global agricultural exports have grown at 3.0 percent per year in real terms 
compared to production growth at 0.7 percent per year thus doubling the share of production to 
exports (from 19 percent in 1971 to 40 percent in 2003).6 The composition of exports has also 
changed for both developed and developing countries (Minot and Roy 2006) with a shift towards 
HVA  products  like  fruits  and  vegetables,  fish,  and  livestock,  even  though  these  are  highly 
perishable and subject to stricter SPS requirements (Figures 1 and 2). In 1982, beverage crops and 
spices (particularly coffee, tea, and cocoa) were the largest agricultural exports. Since then, net 
exports of F&V and fish and seafood have increased almost four-fold (for F&V from US$5.3 
billion in 1982 to US$20.1 billion in 2003). During this same period, fish and seafood exports 
reached US$17.5 billion in 2003, becoming the second-largest component in exports. Currently, 
fresh food exports account for half of all food and agriculture exports from LDCs to high income 
countries; however, these products may be subject to greater food safety risks and trade barriers 
arising from SPS regulations (Unnevehr 2000).   
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Note: Crop and livestock exports from FAO statistics on primary agricultural products.  Fish and seafood exports 
include both processed and unprocessed 






Figure 2.  Net agricultural exports of developing countries 
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Source: FAOStat (2005) for trade in crops and FAO (2004) for fishery trade. 
3.  DEVELOPMENT OF FOOD SAFETY 
STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS  
Modernization of marketing channels is characterized by a stricter set of food safety and 
quality standards. Henson and Hooker (2001) and Henson and Reardon (2005) point that it is 
private and not public standards that are becoming the predominant drivers of the agri-food 
systems. Loader and Hobbs (1999) suggest that in developing countries, low institutional capacity 
often limits the enforcement of even mandatory public standards leading firms to increasingly 
rely on private standards. Greater use of private standards is aimed at responding to consumers‘ 
quality preferences and reducing the costs of improved quality of inputs (Reardon and Berdeque 
2002).   
WTO members adhere to both the SPS and the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT). These agreements provide broad guidelines for choice of product standards but accept 
national sovereignty in adopting standards provided they could be justified based on risk 
perceptions and scientific assessment. Some nations have moved to harmonize food safety 
regulations, such as the attempt to harmonize pesticide residue limits under the auspices of 
Liaison Committee for Caribbean, Africa, and Pacific (COLECAP). Concurrently, there has been 






Practices (EUREPGAP), ChileGAP, KenyaGAP, ChinaGAP, Naturane [Spain], New Zealand 
Fresh Produce Approved Supplier Program, and Mexico Supreme Quality GAP. Besides, major 
supermarkets have their own standards like Tesco‘s Nature‘s Choice and Mark & Spencer‘s Farm 
to Fork that require compliance via third party certification (Hatanaka et al. 2005). 
The spurt in private standards has been partly driven by the events of food safety failures 
in the eighties and nineties (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Dolan et al.. 1999; Freidberg 2003 and 
2004). With several standards in practice, there have been attempts to harmonize globally with the 
formation of Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). The major goal of GFSI was to create a global 
set of voluntary but universally accepted standards of food safety, quality and security (Freidberg 
2005). In case of pesticide residue limits for example, the GFSI intended to eliminate situations 
where some countries demand compliance with Codex Alimentarius, while other impose their 
own limits.  
As it is difficult for the supermarkets to identify products grown under specific protocols, 
firms meeting guidelines try to distinguish themselves. Thus, in developed countries, retailers 
have developed private food safety protocols. Reardon et al.. (2003) suggest the rise of private 
standards as 1) strategic tools by the supermarkets to differentiate themselves; 2) instruments of 
supply chain coordination by standardizing product requirements across suppliers; 3) substitutes 
for missing or inadequate standards in less developed regions; and 4) strategic tools over the 






4.  ROLE OF SUPPLY CHAINS IN THE DELIVERY 
OF FRUITS AND VEGETABLES  
Types of markets available to producers in LDCs 
Currently, in most developing countries producers supply to three different markets: the 
domestic traditional markets, modern urban markets, and export markets. These markets differ in 
several organizational respects but, most importantly, in their demand for food safety (World 
Bank 2006 – Table 1). The food safety requirements are most stringent in the export markets (in 






Table 1.  Three types of markets and their characteristics 
  Types of market 
Market 
characteristics 
Traditional local fruit 
and vegetable markets 






Export markets in industrial 
countries (retail markets, 









Retailers try to control and 
sell ―safety‖. 
High consumer concern. 
High retailer requirements 





Emerging importance of 
grading, stable supply. 
High requirements of grading, 





Little or no net benefit 
from coordination. 
Little durability in 




Efforts by retailers to 
control quality, safety, and 
reliability of supply. 
Net financial benefits from 





Durable relations within supply 
chain, often on contractual basis. 
Cooperation between buyers, 
exporters, growers on 
technology, information, 
sometimes on finance. 




Limited willingness to 
pay for quality and 
safety. 
Moderate. 
Moderate willingness to pay 
for quality and safety. 
Relatively high.  
High willingness to pay for 
quality and safety. 
Value added   Very low  Low/moderate  Moderate/high 
Trust between 
buyers and sellers 
Not very important.  Of emerging importance.  Crucial factor for long-term 
successful relations. 
Competitiveness 
depends mainly on. 
Supply at low cost.  Sufficient quantity of 
improved quality.  
 
Large quantity required. 
Efficient, effective coordinated 
supply chains. 
Flexible response to changing 
demand. 




No constraints.  Emerging constraints in 
meeting requirements of 
quality, safety, consistency 
of product, regular supply. 
Only if well organized in out-
grower schemes and able to 
guarantee safety and uniform 
quality. 






CONSTRAINTS FACING THE SMALLHOLDERS IN THE EMERGING 
FOOD SYSTEM 
The new and emerging food system (dominated by domestic urban market and export 
markets) with high demands for compliance with food safety and traceability disfavor the 
smallholders due to high coordination costs. The problem is exacerbated by geographic 
dispersion, low education, and poor access to capital and information (Poulton 2005; Humphrey 
2005; Rich and Narrod 2005). Because of high transaction and marketing costs of sourcing from 
smallholders, major exporters produce HVA on their own farms or source from medium and large 
outgrowers trained and trusted to deliver on both traceability and food safety requirements.  
The smallholders face problem in the two dynamic markets in meeting the standards as 
well as in ensuring the delivery of a regular supply to their buyers. The list of constraints that 
smallholders face in the HVA markets given below draws from Rich and Narrod (2005): 
  High fixed costs in production and marketing, especially due to the need to comply with 
the standards given high perishability. 
  Difficulties in guaranteeing safe products. This can arise either in terms of the quality or 
the misuse of inputs or the lack of knowledge about the introduction, growth, and 
transport of pathogens, which can be magnified as products move along the supply chain. 
For credence goods, reputation matters significantly for demand creation. Smallholders 
usually have a small history of presence in the markets and lack branding.  
  Asymmetric and incomplete information and high transaction costs may exist between 
actors in the supply chain. Lack of information regarding production and marketing can 
especially deter smallholders as procurement and processing of information involves 
large fixed costs.  
  Lack of incentives and resources to invest in quality improvement, low access to credit, 
and the low returns from investing in quality (as they lack reputation) disadvantage the 
small farmers.     
   
The supply chain in most developing countries is often characterized by transactions in 
spot markets, implying limited coordination among farmers, traders, and consumers. This lack of 
coordination coupled with poor infrastructure (for example, absence of cold storage) imply that 
participants lack incentive to reduce microbial pathogens, mycotoxins, and pesticide residues 






The economies of scale become prominent in the presence of FSS, thus disadvantaging 
the smallholders. Consider, for example, the procurement of information regarding FSS. This 
information, once obtained, can be disseminated at low marginal costs. Unless there is a large 
volume of output over which the fixed costs can be distributed, it will not be economical to incur 
these transaction costs defined broadly to include costs for the collection of market information, 
negotiations, monitoring, and enforcement of business transactions (Jaffee and Morton 1995). 
Additionally, marketing costs (such as requirement of cooling) require lumpy investments leading 
to scale economies. In HVA chains, smallholders are thus likely to face problems in quality 
control, handling, and storage (Bienabe and Sautier 2005). Moreover, once involved in HVA 
chains, smallholders individually enjoy only limited bargaining power (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2001).7
     
Role of Institutions in enabling smallholders market access in HVA 
chains  
Given the constraints outlined above, the focus of this study is on CA and PPPs in 
enabling smallholders to access the HVA chains with FSS. Conceptually, the role of CA arises 
wherever there are economies of scale in production or in marketing. This includes the role of 
farmer groups in being better able to ensure traceability. In these chains, the costs for the 
establishment of traceability are lower for firms and farms with collective action than without it. 
Similarly, collective action has a rationale if agents in the supply chain have different comparative 
advantages. Thus, a producer group (with comparative advantage in production) could benefit 
from collaboration with agents that have expertise in marketing.  
Table 2 below presents a summary of the different processes and the role that CA plays in 
each context. This list is not intended to be exhaustive but is aimed at presenting indicative cases 
pointing to a basis for CA. In exporting, information about the demands of the markets and the 
terms and conditions of the contract and the process of the establishment of contracts has to 
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can bring. Even when regulatory norms are appropriate, changes in consumer demand can have negative 
impacts on smallholders if retailer‘s sourcing decisions change in response (Humphrey 2005). 






precede the production process. Procurement and processing of information clearly involves fixed 
costs. Similarly, negotiation of contracts might involve a big component of costs not related to 
output. Hence, these create a clear basis for grouping of small farmers to overcome diseconomies 
of scale.  
 
Table 2.  Production processes in markets with IFSS and the role of collective action    
Supply Chain 
Process 
Role played by collective action  
Pre- 
production  
  Procurement of information about markets and the process of formation of 
contracts 
  Dissemination of the information relating to IFSS 
  Undertaking of lumpy investments 
Production     Procurement of cheaper inputs through bulk buying  
  Use of extension services 
  Establishment of traceability system   
Post harvest 
and Marketing  
  Collective marketing leading to reduced costs (for example in transport) 
  Grading and certification for the farmer groups 
  Collaboration with marketing experts   
 
Additionally, PPPs might be required to play a complementary role in linking small 
farmers with HVA markets. The traditional public supply functions can be inadequate to meet the 
needs of the HVA supply chains from the perspective of the smallholders. Traditional public 
sector activities such as extension, research and development, and price and marketing policies 
have been largely commodity-based and hence may not provide the support smallholders require 
in a HVA supply chain. The private sector has traditionally been directly involved in the 
production, marketing, and distribution of agricultural commodities, the rise in HVA commodities 
giving an ever-larger and more specific role to the private actors. 
Table 3 presents the different supply chain support processes and the institutional roles 
played by the private and the public sectors. Wherever the public or the private sector by itself 
cannot provide the supply chain support that caters to the needs of the smallholders, there arises a 
need for partnerships. The last column in table 3 provides insights on the basis for PPPs in HVA 
chains. For example, in the extension services relating to HVA, the public knowledge might be 
limited while the access to private information might also be constrained owing to low 






Table 3.  Public and private sector roles in the supply chain management of HVA 
Supply Chain Support 
Processes 
Needed Roles for 
SCM 




Public Sector  Private Sector 
Extension services  Knowledge of 
specialized 




Services to farmers 
and firms linked to 
private company 
Low and variable 
access to public or 
private extension; 
limited public 




Management of flows 
between chain links 
quickly and 
efficiently; Reduce 
distribution costs to 













for smallholders or not 
attuned to small 
farmer‘s needs 
Information services  Integration of 
information flows 
across supply chain  
Provision of 







(MIS) and electronic 
data interchange 
(EDI)  
Reliance on public 
information systems 
not tuned to market 
needs, exclusion from 
private sources for 





standards on food 







and regulations  
Private certification 
and development and 
enforcement of 
private standards;  
Smallholders‘ ability 
to meet public or 
private standards 
limited; Development 
not based on 




















of contracts biased 
against small farmers; 
divergence in market 
power between chain 
actors 
Source: Rich and Narrod (2005) 






CA and PPPs clearly play complementary roles in linking small farmers with HVA 
markets. Where CA is necessary under many circumstances, it may not be sufficient. Consider a 
group of small farmers that has to finance a lumpy investment. To this group, the private sector 
loans might not be forthcoming at terms that the group finds economical. The private discount 
rates tend to be high, while gestation lags in investments, especially with smallholders, tend to be 
long. This creates a role for the public sector with lower discount rates (possibly with some 
subsidy) in credit markets.    
 
5.  FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTION AND 
THEIR SUPPLY CHAINS FROM THREE CASE 
STUDIES  
Following on the discussions above, we focus on 3 supply chains involving smallholders 
for fruit and vegetable exports in India, Kenya, and Mexico. In Kenya, the domestic market for 
green beans hardly exists. The smallholders have been involved in producing beans for export for 
some time even before the relatively recent demand for food safety. In the Mexican case, 
smallholders were supplying both the domestic and the export markets with cantaloupes until the 
outbreak of salmonella, which resulted in a total ban on all exports for a year. Exports only 
resumed a year later when firms adopted voluntary best management practices. In the process 
they began to source primarily from medium and large scale producers. In the Indian grape case, 
Mahagrapes, the marketing partner of cooperatives, built upon an existing network of producer 
organizations that were already producing good quality grapes (including organic farming) but 
lacked the marketing expertise for export. Now, the smallholders are actively involved in exports 
and successfully meet the FSS of the western markets. Below we discuss these cases. 
 
Green Bean Production in Kenya8 
                                                       






Kenyan green bean supply chains 
Currently, green beans are marketed through three chains - the export supermarket chain, 
the export wholesale chain, and the domestic chain (figure 3). These chains are distinguished by 
the degree of coordination following the need to comply with IFSS and the demand for a 
traceability system. The supermarket chain is the most closely coordinated and typically requires 
establishment of a functional traceability system. In Figure 3, traceability requirements are 




Figure 3.  Kenya's green beans supply chain 
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The UK supermarket chain has the most stringent food safety requirements (Singh 2002; 
Jaffee 2003; Henson, et al. 2005). Green beans marketed through this chain must be certified (by 
an accredited third party) as meeting EUREPGAP, BRC, and, in most cases, retailers‘ private 
food safety protocols. The beans must be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate issued by a 
competent authority guaranteeing absence of prohibited pests. In addition, the beans must be 
traceable from the retailer‘s shelf back to the grower‘s plot. 
Handling and hygiene practices during harvesting, grading, and packing of green beans 
are all closely monitored. Growers are required to have a toilet, pesticide storage unit, and a 
facility for hand washing at the farm or the grading shed. Exporters to the EU supermarkets test 
the water and soil twice a year for pathogens. The exporters also require farmers to keep records 
of the type and quality of inputs (pesticide, water, or soil) used. These records accompany green 
beans to the exporters‘ packhouses. Farmers keep records of production and handling practices 
either individually or collectively (in case of a farmer group). In order to enforce compliance with 
these practices, EU importers have increased their monitoring and coordination of input use. They 
generally monitor the exporters expecting them to monitor growers in turn. Increasingly, some 
EU importers have extended their monitoring to farm level through regular visits. 
The most serious attention to the possibility of contamination occurs in the exporters‘ 
packhouses. Exporters in this chain have all invested in packhouses with good manufacturing 
practices (GMPs). Workers are required to wear special clothing and rubber boots in the pack 
houses and to wash their hands at regular intervals or when they change shifts. Some exporters 
monitor worker hygiene (especially the washing of hands) in the packhouse. Such exporters 
randomly swab the hands of workers and test for pathogens. If the swab tests positive for any of 
the pathogens of concern, that worker is penalized. All containers used at various stages of the 
processing are color-coded to avoid mixing and cross-contamination with pathogens. In addition 
to strict adherence to hygiene during processing (sorting, chopping, and arranging beans into 
trays), packing and bar coding are done under temperature-controlled conditions.  







Green beans from most small and medium farmers feed into the wholesale chain where 
monitoring and coordination is less pronounced. Here the focus is often on the physical 
characteristics (e.g., size, spotlessness) as opposed to the credence attributes (e.g., pesticide 
residue content). However, meeting the EU‘s public standards is mandated, and consistency of 
volume in supplies is desired. A large proportion of beans in this chain originate from the spot 
market (hence do not satisfy traceability) and are usually not grown under supervision by the 
exporter. Consequently, the quality (in terms of pesticide residues) cannot be ascertained even by 
inspection at the market. Generally, the wholesale chain is used by exporters who find it 
uneconomical to comply with the private FSS of the supermarkets. Such exporters are generally 
the small and medium sized lacking adequate quality management systems (Humphrey 2002).  
Domestic chain 
The FSS are least pronounced in the domestic chain comprising fresh or processed beans. 
The fresh green beans in domestic supermarkets tend to be the overflow from sales to UK 
supermarkets. Some fresh beans are sold also to the wholesale markets and to open retail. 
Currently, the supermarket buyers do not have any specific system of checking and verifying the 
quality. There is also no system of preventing contamination of beans with pathogens. Five firms 
in Kenya are involved in green bean canning and sell primarily to France. Since FSS is less 
stringent in canned beans, the processing firms source the majority of their green beans from 
smallholders. Indeed, the only FSS for processors is the pesticide residue limit. Thus, firms use 
their own pesticide applicators and handle the purchase and storage of pesticides themselves.  
Grape exports from India
9 
In 2005, India was the third biggest producer of fruits and second largest vegetable 
producer in the world (FAO 2005). But India is a small horticultural exporter mainly because of 
lack of off-farm competitiveness (World Bank 2005). Smallholder dominated agriculture restricts 
the number of farmers able to adopt sophisticated farm practices and undertake the investments 
(like cold storage) to meet stringent IFSS (Umali-Deininger and Sur 2006).   
                                                       






India’s grape supply chain 
  Figure 4 shows the supply chain for the three main varieties of grapes produced by the 
grape farmers: viz. Thompson seedless, Sonaka, and Sharad seedless. The first variety is targeted 
mainly for exports to European markets. The Sharad seedless variety is sold mainly in the 






Figure 4.  Supply chain for Mahagrapes and independent grape producers 
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Harvest and packing of grapes  
There are stringent requirements in pruning and packing of the grapes. After harvesting, 
the grapes are transported to a cooperative collection center where pre-cooling and cold storage 
facilities exist. Some amounts of grapes are screened off based on initial damage, bunch 
composition, etc. Some farmers, especially the small farmers, do the pruning near their farms and 
then transport grapes to the cooperative centers. Some grapes after the second round of tests may 
be rejected at the cooperative collection center. The grapes that are rejected at the collection 
center are generally sold to middlemen and find their way to the local market. The post harvest 
facilities have to meet the sanitation and hygiene requirements under the EUREPGAP. At the 
packing station before the grapes are packed, the packages are coded for traceability.     
Shipping 
Shipping for exports is done by the cooperative in collaboration with Mahagrapes. 
Refrigerated containers pick up grapes from the cooperative collection centers maintaining the 
cold chain. The cooperatives charge a logistic fee per unit of grape supplied. The grapes rejected 
for exports (similar to grapes intended for domestic markets) are shipped in non-corrugated boxes 
to local markets. They are not packed in pallets nor are they labeled for traceback. The export 
grapes are packed in pallets and covered with sulfur dioxide sheets (imported from China) to 
preserve quality as grapes are shipped by sea over long distance. If shipped for local markets, the 
mode of transport tends to be in open trucks with paper bags packed under wooden crates.   
Mexico’s cantaloupe production10 
A salmonella outbreak in 2002 detected in shipments from Guerrero led to the ban of 
cantaloupe exports. Prior to the ban, almost 90 percent of Mexican F&V exports were to the U.S. 
Following the ban, Mexican cantaloupe exports reduced by 97 percent, with a loss of 5,909 
hectares under production (23.5 percent reduction) (Avendaño et al. forthcoming). Most U.S. 
retail firms after the outbreak started demanding suppliers to meet GAPs and GMPs to minimize 
microbial contamination in fresh produce. To meet this demand, the Mexican government tried to 
                                                       






develop a strategy by signing a memorandum of understanding on actions needed to comply. This 
was followed by the publication of an emergency regulation to develop a new FSS program for 
FVs. 
With this in place, the U.S. opened the market to selected firms that gained Mexican and 
U.S. government approval, and a new program for imports of cantaloupe was announced in late 
2005. To adopt GAPs, growers had to have technical assessments of their operations, make 
investments to bring their farms up to standards, and pay for third-party audits certifying 
compliance with GAPs.  
 
Mexico’s cantaloupe supply chain 
Mexico‘s cantaloupe chain comprises two different streams (figure 5): one associated 
with export oriented large firms, and second involving smallholders catering to the international 
markets before the salmonella outbreak (mainly through big firms with packing facilities). 




Figure 5.  Mexico’s cantaloupe supply chain 
 
Source: Avendaño et al. (forthcoming) 






In production, firms usually rent land to smallholders for production and in some cases 
contract with them. Nearly 825 hectares are used for this crop in Colima: 75 percent of the land 
use in cantaloupe belongs to an ejido system (1 to 14 hectares with 6 hectares as the average per 
grower), 25 percent to small property (up to 300 hectares); 29 percent of cantaloupe growers rent 
land for production, and 71 percent are smallholders that work on owned land.11  
Most growers (92 percent) use drip irrigation, plastic quilted beds, and certified seeds. 
White fly is the main threat, but it is relatively under control with the techniques in use (drip and 
bed). Only 4 percent of growers qualify for GAPs. Moreover, there is no evidence of other types 
of microbiological risk reduction; thus, regaining of market access in the US seems unlikely in 
the short run. To implement a food safety program, growers have to start with incorporation of 
GAPs and pay attention to the quality of water, a major source of contamination.   
Harvest and packing 
Meeting GAPs during growing and harvesting can be difficult for small growers. They 
must keep records of fertilizers, irrigation, pesticides and chemicals applications, and observe the 
proper time to harvest (until chemicals are absorbed). Once harvested, big firms (export-oriented) 
send the product to the packing facilities for post harvest treatment, which includes washing, 
brushing, selection, pre-cooling, sizing, pre-packing, cold storage, and carton repacking. From 
packing houses the product goes to the market. Only two packing houses are in process to obtain 
a food safety certification to export to the USA. Small growers without a prior arrangement with 
a packing house have the choice to sell to a middleman at the orchard. Once in the packing house, 
if product does not meet the quality standards demanded by the packers, it can go to (fresh) 
domestic market or to the process industry without packing. If packed, product goes to fresh 
export market or domestic market. 
Shipping 
Shipping for export is usually done by the same growers (big firms that own transport 
and can preserve the cold chain). Export is done mainly through brokers and wholesalers in the 
                                                       
11 The ejido is a tenure system through which the government promotes the use of communal land shared 





North American market, and gets to the institutional sector (supermarkets, hospitals, restaurants, 
hotels, etc.) on the way to consumers. Product going to CEDA does not preserve the cold chain 
and is usually transported in open trucks. Once in CEDA, product is distributed to small buyers 
related to street markets, fruit stores, and public markets. Ninety percents of the produce goes to 
domestic markets and the rest to export.  
 
Marketing  
The producer may sell directly to a middleman. Sometimes cantaloupe is bought directly 
at the farm by a middleman, who can bring it to either the packing house, to the supply center, or 
to a domestic processor. For products going directly into the domestic processing, no post harvest 
processing is required. Domestic processors sell mostly in domestic markets in different forms: 
frozen or canned. The packing process is one of the most important phases in the cantaloupe 
chain. For export as well as for institutional markets, the facility must have a food safety program 
and be certified by a third party. For example, if product is going to the EU, it must comply with 
EUREPGAP; for the US, food safety certification is generally done by North American firms like 
Primus Lab recognized by the market.  
The institutional sector gets its supply from CEDA or directly from packers. When 
products come from CEDA, it is difficult to trace back the origin. The supplies for the 
institutional sector in the US require a system of traceability. Direct access to supermarkets is 
recent for cantaloupe growers. Only 17 percent of Colima growers sell directly to supermarkets 
since they need to have packing facilities. Though an important market, the need for packing 
facilities and the delay in payments by supermarkets has obviated the participation of the small 
growers. In a study by ANTAD (2005), 38 percent of fresh fruit and vegetables go to public 
markets and 29 percent to supermarkets. The supply centers (CEDAs) are also the main importers 
for fresh products which they also import from the U.S. Sometimes, they are just returned 
exports. Most imports from the U.S. wholesalers go either to public markets, fruit stands, or to the 





6.  DIFFICULTIES SMALLHOLDERS HAVE IN 
PARTICIPATING IN THESE SUPPLY CHAINS 
With these stringent requirements in the coordinated supply chains with IFSS, we now 
focus on the difficulties that smallholders face in these specific chains.   
Smallholders in Kenyan green bean supply chain  
Prior to mid 1990s, Kenya‘s green bean industry was dominated by smallholders with 
their share in output being greater than 60 percent (Kimenye 1993). Currently, this share is 
believed to be less than 40 percent (Dolan et al. 1999; Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Jaffee 2003; 
Jensen, n.d.). High value products are labor intensive, making it cheaper to grow on family farms 
with self monitoring labor (Collins 1995). However, these advantages have generally been 
outweighed by the higher transaction costs of working with smallholders, and exporters have 
shifted from smallholders to medium and large scale, and own farms for green beans (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000; Jaffee 2003).  
The dominant transaction cost in linking with smallholders is the cost of monitoring 
compliance with IFSS and the insistence on traceability by importers. Medium and large 
outgrowers also have access to own, debt, or venture capital to invest in costly facilities required 
by IFSS including grading shed, cold storage, and pesticide storage unit (Jensen, n.d). The post 
harvest facilities involve lumpy investment and entail economies of scale; hence, competitiveness 
is achievable only with high volumes (Debertin 2002). The traceability and residue limit 
requirements further disadvantage the smallholders as they are poorly educated and/or unskilled. 
By comparison, larger farmers can invest in specialized skills needed to comply with FSS 
(Collins 1995).   
Smallholders in Indian grape supply chain  
Several market failures plague the supply chain of Indian horticultural exports. Most 
importantly, the Indian exports lack good reputation in external markets. Therefore, any private 





Indeed, the large farmers export independently under their own brand. In addition, certification is 
expensive, and smallholders cannot individually bear the costs.  
Several post harvest technologies (like cold storage) require lumpy investments, and 
credit constrained farmers would not be able to make those investments. In the limited cold 
storage facilities that exist, there is large monopoly power for the providers and, unless provided 
by the cooperative, small farmers cannot afford it. Also, the private sector has not invested in pre-
cooling facilities given the small paying capacity and gestation lags in such investment.  
The presence of middlemen in these chains accounts for another market failure. The 
middlemen charge high commission costs ranging from 15 to 40 percent of the domestic 
consumer price for grapes (based on field survey of grape farmers). To the extent that 
smallholders rely more on middlemen, they are affected more adversely.  
Smallholders in the Mexican cantaloupe chain  
Several market failures arise also in Mexico‘s cantaloupe chain (figure 6). The first 
relates to imperfect information and access to inputs. Most smallholders rely on input suppliers 
for inputs on credit, but the cost of financing reflected in the final price is usually much higher 





Figure 6.   Mexico cantaloupe chain and market failures 
 
   
 
A second market failure is the lack of access to packing facilities for smallholders. Large 
packing firms pay small growers a price set by themselves, not by the market, and thereby limit 
the participation of small growers in this stage of the chain. A third market failure is due to the 
presence of the middlemen who tend to offer lower prices to small growers due to the lack of 





7.  ROLE OF VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN 
INVOLVING SMALLHOLDERS IN THESE 
MARKETS 
Thus, there are factors in these supply chains (some generic and some specific to the 
chains) that would exclude the smallholders without any intervention. As discussed above, owing 
to the nature of HVA export markets involving IFSS, there is rationale for CA and PPPs in 
marking these markets more accessible for smallholders.  
Collective action for sustainable management of resources among resource dependent 
populations has been studied extensively (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002; Lam 1998; Kant 
2000). The role of collective action in achieving market access through cooperatives has also 
been widely documented (Baron 1978, Ranade 1983, and Wilkins 1983, for example). The 
transaction cost approach to the determination of organizational and institutional structure 
explains organizational forms as originating to minimize the transaction costs in a given 
environment (Staatz 1984). The institutional structures and innovations that we discuss here aim 
to minimize the transaction costs and exploit the economies of scale wherever applicable.     
Coping strategies for smallholders in Kenyan green bean exports: The role of CA 
and PPP 
Two forms of institutional arrangements have enabled market access for the small 
farmers in fresh beans: contract production with individual farmers or with farmer groups (Okello 
et al., forthcoming). The contracted outgrowers in farmer groups are usually smallholders with 
weekly sales of fewer than 100 kilograms. Several of these farmer groups jointly invest in 
facilities needed to comply with IFSS and also have technical assistants or trained leaders that 
help members meet the standards. Buyers work very closely with groups in providing both 
training and other technical support to members and facilitate their compliance with the FSS.12  
                                                       
12 One of the coping strategies adopted by small farmers as discussed above has been market switching. 
Several smallholders have shifted to producing for the canning industry. In 2000, only a few hundreds of 
farmers grew beans for the canning industry. Fintrac-Horticultural Development Center (a Kenyan NGO) 
estimates that by 2004, thousands of smallholder farmers were growing beans for one of Kenya‘s leading 
green bean canner, with 3000 having attained EUREPGAP certification. Less stringent FSS imply that the 





Apart from this endogenous adjustment by the small farmers, institutions have emerged 
to enable smallholders to access markets with IFSS. The arrangements comprise CA among 
farmers or with different agents in the supply chain and formation of partnerships among NGOs, 
donors, and the public sector. In Kenya, green bean farmer groups existed even prior to the IFSS. 
The reason they existed was primarily for marketing, i.e. to find a buyer and negotiate better 
prices for members. Beginning in the late 1990s (with IFSS), exporters began transforming the 
way these smallholder groups operated (Jaffee 2003).  
First, the groups were reorganized and their sizes reduced from as high as 350 farmers to 
less than 30 farmers per group. The farmers were trained on IFSS and on the production practices. 
The farmers were then subjected to close monitoring under more formal contracts than the 
procurement arrangement that existed before. Some exporters supervised group members 
individually and penalized the individuals for violation of practices, but most supervised the 
group as a whole and penalized all the members for violations (Okello 2005). The farmer 
organizations also conduct training for members and facilitate farmer to farmer monitoring in the 
absence of the exporter‘s field technical assistant (TA) and/or to reinforce exporter‘s training. The 
organizations invite experts to train farmers on GAPs, especially on the observance of pre-harvest 
interval following application of pesticides, integrated pest management, packer hygiene, and 
establishing and maintaining a functional traceability system.13  
Some exporters require the farmer organizations to hire their own technical assistants 
(TAs) who can respond to members‘ hygiene, pest, and disease problems readily, and a clerk. The 
TA occasionally conducts field visits with an exporter‘s agronomist as part of the training and 
also keeps records for all the members of the type, amount, and date of pesticides used. The clerk, 
on the other hand, enforces compliance with hygiene requirements within the grading shed. This 
strategy is used by a few leading exporters.  
                                                                                                                                                              
farm, grading shed) thus removing the scale-dependent determinants of competitiveness (Fintrac-
Horticultural Development Center 2004). 
13 The main benefit from grouping has been the lowering of per capita costs of compliance with the IFSS 
for the small farmers. Okello et al. (forthcoming) show that the costs of compliance with the IFSS for a 
small farmer would be around 10 times higher if they were not a member of a farmer group. Several costs 
of compliance involve fixed costs such as construction of grading sheds which, unless distributed over a 
large output, would make it uneconomical to access markets with IFSS.  For example, on average for an 
individual small farmer, the costs of compliance with IFSS based on a conservative estimate would be 
almost 70 percent of the income, while in a 15 member group it would be just 4 percent.  





Some producer organizations instead hire a team of expert pesticide applicators that spray 
green bean fields for farmers under interlinked credit arrangements by the group. The TA 
dispenses only the right kind and quantity of pesticide based on the growth stage of the crop and 
outcome of pest scouting. Such producer organizations may also have their own pesticide stores. 
To ensure traceability, producer organizations jointly hire field technical assistants and 
depot/grading shed clerks who compile the records required under IFSS.  
The organization of the producer groups and hence the CA among farmers as discussed 
above is tuned to enabling the small farmers to comply with IFSS. Hiring a technical expert or 
investing in facilities are possible because of joint sharing of costs. Most importantly, for the 
buyers, having the producer groups enables them to implement a functional traceability system 
whereby a clerk holds accounts from several small farmers at once and also creates a system of 
farmer to farmer monitoring, akin to group liability system in microfinance.    
Where does the partnership with the public sector play a role here? First, the formation of 
producer organizations entails transaction costs related to search and screening of members. 
Therefore, formation of some smallholder organizations has been facilitated by the governments, 
exporters, non governmental organizations, and donors. Additionally, donor and NGO funding 
has sponsored farmer‘s EUREPGAP training, audits, and certification.   
The government moreover has adopted some policies aimed at promoting compliance 
with IFSS such as i) partnering with donors and NGOs to provide training and physical 
infrastructure; ii) partnering with the fresh export industry to lobby importers for adaptation of 
EUREPGAP requirements to developing country conditions; and iii) conducting awareness 
campaigns and limited training to smallholder farmers on importance of meeting IFSS. The 
Government in partnership with Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) established a 
company that owns cold storage facilities. This partnership has also trained more than 100 
smallholder farmer group leaders as IFSS service providers and many farmers belonging to 
farmer groups on good agricultural practices (HCDA 2005). The government partnering with 
USAID and major exporters conducts pest surveillance inspections on small green bean farms. 
USAID has also funded capacity building in local government certification agencies through staff 
training and establishment of pathogen and pesticide residue testing facilities that can bring down 
the costs of certification for the smallholders. Further, USAID funding has also facilitated 
partnership between Kenya Horticultural Development Project (KHDP) and green bean exporters. 





Donors and NGOs have also jointly established Africa‘s only indigenous certification 
company aimed at making EUREPGAP certification cheaper and hence accessible to 
smallholders. A PPP between UK Department for International Development (DFID) and HCDA 
(Horticultural Crops Development Authority) has trained a pool of export horticulture service 
providers. Three NGOs (namely, Care International (Kenya), Reach the Children Inc, and ICIPE) 
are partnering with the private firms to train, audit, and/or financially help smallholders to obtain 
EUREPGAP certification. Most of these NGOs are supported by donor agencies. In addition, 
ICIPE is currently partnering with green bean exporters (e.g., Kenya Horticultural Exporters and 
Woni) to train EUREPGAP trainers and other horticultural industry service providers. Reach the 
Children Inc. has activities that involve 10 smallholder farmer groups in Machakos. The activities 
include EUREPGAP certification, training in good agricultural practices, micro-credit services, 
and market linkage program.  
Another NGO, Pride Africa, works on creating linkages between various actors in the 
horticultural industry aimed at i) training on good agricultural practices and access to technical 
information; ii) access to credit; and iii) access to the export market. It has facilitated linkages 
between farmer groups and EUREPGAP trainers, input sellers, banks, and exporters. The Pride 
Africa-Donor partnership facilitates smallholders access to credit needed to finance IFSS 
investments and transition from old to new but often costly pesticides. Pride Africa is sponsored 
by international donors including IDRC, IFAD, and FORD Foundation. The Pesticide Initiative 
Program, a European Union funded project run by the Liaison Committee for Europe, Africa, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (COLEACP), supports capacity building among green bean exporters.  
Compliance with standards by the Mahagrapes farmers through collective action 
and PPP
14 
Mahagrapes has enabled farmers in several ways to ensure their compliance with IFSS. 
Kleinwechter and Grethe (2005), while analyzing the adoption of EUREPGAP standards by 
mango exporters in Peru, differentiate the compliance process into three stages: the information 
stage followed by a decision stage, followed subsequently by an implementation stage. 
Mahagrapes and the cooperatives have been active in all the three stages of the compliance 
process. Even before the actual creation of Mahagrapes, efforts were made by some of the leading 
and educated farmers of the region to involve the numerous pre-existing grape growing farmer 
                                                       





groups under the umbrella of Mahagrapes. In order to convince the group leaders, a team of seven 
people: five farmers, one scientist, and one government official visited Europe to see for 
themselves how grape farming, processing, and marketing was done along with the nature and 
form of inputs used and marketing methods followed. A part of the cost of this visit was funded 
by the state government. These lead farmers were convinced that the grape produced by the 
farmers was of quality good enough to be exported to Europe provided they could meet the 
standards and safety regulations, and thus Mahagrapes came to be set up. 
Mahagrapes holds workshops where information on the standards is disseminated to the 
member farmers. Farmers and grape handlers/sorters (primarily women) are continuously 
informed about and trained in the latest grape growing and handling methods and processes. The 
cooperatives and Mahagrapes jointly update the list of banned and approved pesticides and 
fertilizers continuously, which varies with time and across markets. Similarly, the changes in the 
permissible levels of chemical residues are also provided by them regularly. All this information 
is published in the form of a yearly handbook in the native language and distributed free of 
charge to members. In addition, acquiring a EUREPGAP certificate individually is costly for the 
small and medium grape farmers. However, Mahagrapes has managed to provide cooperatives 
with this certification. Thus, member farmers now have to pay just Rs. 1200 (approximately $28) 
for certification which is much less than the cost of individual membership.  
Once the information on the standards is available, action is needed relating to the 
decision on implementation. In the implementation stage, Mahagrapes provides materials and 
technical help along with infrastructural support to facilitate the implementation of the standards. 
Similar to the Kenyan case, some farmers are trained as technical experts and ensure that 
implementation of production practices satisfies the FSS. Mahagrapes also provides the farmers 
with packaging material which comply with international norms. Plastic bags and pallets in which 
the grapes are first packed are imported from Spain and other places. Special sulphur dioxide 
sheets are imported from China. In the purchase of inputs, the role of CA presents itself quite 
distinctly. The production and marketing process requires several imported inputs where the 
differences in prices for farmers because of bulk buying by cooperatives are substantial.15  Bio-
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fertilizer and bio-pesticide are developed and produced by Mahagrapes and provided to member 
farmers cheaper than market rates.16  
Apart from CA on the part of farmers that has made farmers well informed about the 
market requirements and has facilitated lower costs of production, partnerships with public 
agencies have played a very important role. For example, regular monitoring of the grape plant by 
the scientists from the National Research Centre (NRC) in Pune (a government agency) ensures 
that the plant remains in sanitary condition throughout the year and not just in the fruiting season.   
Also, during the initial time periods with high rates of rejection, the role played by the 
government was critical. The role of the government over time has been akin to infant industry 
protection and thereby is a good example of PPP. State bodies like Maharashtra State Agricultural 
Marketing Board (MSAMB) deputed and paid the salaries of the first governing officers. 
MSAMAB also provided funds for consultancy services from experts on agri-marketing, 
packaging, and technical services such as refrigeration and cooling. The government body, 
National Cooperative Development Commission (NCDC), was also of great help along with 
Agriculture and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA), and National 
Horticulture Board. The agency provided subsidized credit for the installation of post harvest 
facilities that were crucial in bringing down the consignment rejection rates substantially.17
 
Cooperatives linked with Mahagrapes with partial financial aid from the state government and 
partial self-financing have installed pre-coolers and cold storages at all the 16 cooperative 
headquarters (thus showing CA and PPPs in complementary roles).  
Absence of collective action and PPP in the cantaloupe supply chain in Mexico
18 
In Mexico, for the smallholders export was the main reason they went into cantaloupe 
production, and just a small share of the production earlier was sent to domestic market. After a 
new regulation, small growers turned to the domestic market. In the domestic market, 
smallholders also face a problem with poor technical support and low prices during the harvesting 
season of cantaloupes. Currently, most technical support is provided by the inputs suppliers, but 
                                                       
16 These inputs are also sold to non-members but at higher prices, implying cross-subsidization.   
17 In the early years of exports, consignment rejection rates were greater than 80 percent. At present the 
Mahagrapes claims a negligible rate of rejection. The turnaround by Mahagrapes especially in light of the 
struggle by Indian horticultural exports to meet the standards in the western markets makes an exciting case 
study from a food safety and quality point of view. 





only 38 percent of the smallholders receive this type of assistance (from survey of farmers in 
north-western Mexico in 2002). In the growing season, oversupply is a problem; 44 percent of the 
Mexican production is in the summer, from the states of Durango, Coahuila, Chihuahua 
Tamaulipas (Northern Mexico), and for the rest of the regions the growing season is in winter. 
Low prices and the lack of certification on food safety restrict the options for the small growers.  
In the survey, smallholders reported that it is not economical for them to absorb the 
additional cost associated with FSS, and they lacked the skills to keep the registers; they also 
need training and additional employees for the design of standard operations procedures. In the 
survey, 71 percent of farmers had adopted some new food safety practices (Avendaño 2006).  Of 
this group, 9 percent were small farmers, 54 percent were medium, and 37 percent were large. Of 
the non-adopters, 14 percent were small and 86 percent were medium. Another obstacle for 
smallholders was the lack of administrative management; 90 percent of the small growers hardly 
know their costs associated with production, and they do not keep accounting registers and do not 
plan production in advance. Lack of management practices can be explained partly as a result of 
the low educational level among farmers. About 60 percent farmers have primary education (6 
years); 13 percent have secondary (9 years), and only 15 percent high school (11 years).  
Apart from collective action that can help farmers establish packing facilities together 
and afford the certification costs, PPPs can also play an important role. One form of CA and PPP 
that can be useful is the organization of growers in an integrated firm that allows them to buy at 
greater scale with better prices. Growers and government together like in case of Kenyan green 
beans and grapes in India should develop a program to comply with IFSS. PPPs could also be 
useful in supporting research and development activities targeted to the needs of smallholders. 
Such partnerships can be encouraged through institutional agreements between government and 
universities in the region. Cooperation among farmers and partnership with government can 
facilitate the installation of a new packing facility run by small growers.  
Training is also needed in this stage through Food Safety certification where PPP can be 
employed. A PPP can be established to assure cold chain, either through jointly owned cold 
storage or by renting some facilities that can be controlled to keep the quality demanded by 
markets. Similarly, a PPP could be established with the purpose of enabling smallholders to 
achieve certifications such as EUREPGAP required by the markets. The roles of such forms of 





8.  CONCLUSIONS 
     This paper focuses on the access of smallholders to markets with high demands for 
standards related to food safety and quality. We presented three case-studies: green beans in 
Kenya, grapes in India, and cantaloupes in Mexico. These products at different times have faced 
food safety-related barriers, and it has been a challenge to re-orient the production and marketing 
systems to meet the market demands within a system inclusive of the smallholders. The Mexican 
cantaloupe case is distinguished by the screening of the smallholders away from the high 
standards market. The coping mechanism for the smallholders has either been a movement 
towards different crop or shifting the production of cantaloupe towards domestic markets that 
require lower standards. 
The examples of the Kenyan green beans and the Indian grapes point to successful cases 
of smallholder participation in high standard markets. In Kenya, though a number of smallholders 
survived in the fresh beans exports, there was a definite adjustment in the form of moving 
towards production for the beans canning industry which had lower food safety demands. In the 
Indian grapes case, the initial periods when the organization started exporting were characterized 
by extremely high rates of rejection; many cooperatives consisting of smallholders de-linked 
themselves from the export markets. Those producer organizations that stayed have over time 
achieved much greater ability to meet the standards, and as reflected in the negligible rates of 
rejections at present. However, the inability of the smallholders to adjust to IFSS shocks in the 
short run comes out as the common message. In Mexico, after the imposition of the regulation, 
the short run response has been to screen the smallholders away.     
What do these case studies imply for sustainability of smallholder dominated systems in 
high standard markets and the role of CA and PPP? In the Mexico case, there has been an absence 
of any forms of CA and PPP; in addition, little time has elapsed since the IFSS shock occurred. In 
the Kenyan green beans case as well as the case of grape exports from India, the role of CA and 
PPP are clearly identified. However in both these cases, the results were borne out over the long 
run.    
Alternatively, vertical coordination (like contract farming) where some of the costs are 
delegated away to the integrator can help sustain smallholders in IFSS based system. Yet the role 





smallholders involves high transaction costs. Hence, farmer groups become a useful means of 
reducing these linkage costs. Indeed, in contract farming with small farmers, the working system 
has been a vendor type set up where a group of farmers collectively link to a vendor who in turn 
links up with the firm. This type of arrangement is evident in the Kenya beans case where 
contract growing has been adopted. Secondly, the role of collective action is desirable for 
boosting bargaining power for a group of smallholders. One straightforward way for this channel 
to work is by farmer groups handling marketing themselves or with a marketing partner and 
bypassing the intermediaries (as the case of Mahagrapes shows). 
Even though the role of PPPs is important for creating market access for small farmers, 
the role of the government should be supplementary to the private sector as a partner to 
strengthen the asset base and enable risk-taking by insuring in the short run as the smallholders 
cope with the demands of high standard markets. IFSS bring high returns with high risk 
especially in times when the response systems have not matured. The government has a role to 
correct specific market failures in the chain but not to protect the chain itself. The reason we 
emphasize the role of PPPs in this context is that the Kenyan and Indian examples do show that 
smallholders, given time and initial support, can participate in IFSS markets successfully. Indeed, 
these supply chains are very knowledge intensive, and some enabling factors like knowledge 
about technology and markets are required for smallholders to participate in high value 
chains. Thus, though we emphasize the role of fixed costs and the consequent scale diseconomies, 
investments in capacity building of the smallholders (especially in their ability to meet standards) 
where private returns are much lower than social returns have to be undertaken by the public 
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